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ABSTRACT 
 
How does dividend policy effect cost of debt in emerging markets? Does it increase the perceived 
conflict of interests between creditors and shareholders or vice versa? This paper seeks to answer 
these questions by documenting the relationship between dividend payout ratios and cost of debt 
in emerging markets. Using a dataset from the MENA region, we document a significantly 
negative relationship between dividend payout ratios and cost of debt during the period between 
2005 and 2011. We argue that high dividend payouts reduce information asymmetries. 
Consequently, creditors demand lower return for providing their capital to firms. We also show 
that the negative relationship between dividend payout ratios and cost of debt are more 
pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetries. It indicates that value relevance of high 
dividend payout ratios is more in firms that have higher information asymmetries. These firms 
have scarcity of information. Therefore, whenever information environment improves, it is highly 
valued by creditors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n important concern faced by every investor in emerging markets is to accurately gauge the 
financial conditions of firms they are planning to invest in. Financial conditions of firms determine 
the associated risks and, therefore the required rate of returns. Investors demand lower returns for 
investing in firms with lower risk. However, it is not always easy to obtain true information about firms in emerging 
markets. Prior literature associates emerging markets with inadequate disclosure and governance mechanisms – both 
at the firm-level and the country-level. Claessens and Fan (2003), for instance, document that firm-level governance 
mechanisms are weak in emerging markets. While, Khwaja and Mian (2006) show that country-level governance 
structures are relatively ineffective in Pakistan – an emerging market. These and numerous other studies argue that 
weak enforcement of investor protection laws, presence of family control, and lax implementation of anti-director 
rights contribute to ineffectiveness of disclosure and governance mechanisms in emerging markets. An important 
implication of ineffective disclosure and governance mechanisms is that the culture of information disclosure could 
not evolve in these markets. Leuz et al. (2003) document that managers and insiders do not disclose true information 
about their firms in emerging markets. This leaves investors with an impossible task of assessing true value of firms. 
As a consequence, it becomes hard for them to make any informed investment decision.  
 
This paper documents how creditors – one of the main providers of capital – can resolve information 
asymmetries in emerging markets. We argue that dividend policies adopted by firms have incremental information, 
in excess of what is present in the financial statements, for investors regarding the financial conditions of firms. 
Prior literature argues that high dividend payouts alleviate agency conflicts through the reduction of free cash flow 
available with managers (Grossman and Hart, 1980). In a related study, Jensen (1986) concludes that high dividend 
payouts lessen agency problems by reducing free cash flows that can be expensed on unprofitable projects. This 
strand of literature argues that paying high dividends reflects managements’ good faith and signals low agency 
problems. La Porta et al. (2000) formalize the above findings in a theory known as the substitute model. The 
substitute model argues that dividends can substitute for the monitoring roles of the stakeholders. It posits that firms 
operating in relatively poor governance environments make dividend payments to establish a reputation for acting in 
A 
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the best interest of minority shareholders. High dividend payments signal to the market that there is less cash at the 
expense of management to expropriate. Consequently, high dividend payments are associated with lower 
information asymmetries. This paper argues that lower information asymmetries associated with firms paying high 
dividends should translate into lower cost of debt. Our arguments are consistent with Bhojraj and Senpgupta (2003) 
who document a positive correlation between disclosure and bond ratings and a negative relation between disclosure 
and bond yields. They argue that superior disclosure and governance mechanisms reduce default risk by mitigating 
agency costs. In another related study, Mathur et al. (2013) show that debt holders view dividends as a positive 
signal about firm’s prospect. They argue that positive signal emanating through dividend payout results in lower 
bond yields.1 
 
In this paper, we extend the above findings by documenting the impact of dividend payout ratios on cost of 
debt in the MENA region (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and 
United Arab Emirates) during the region between 2005 and 2011. Our results show that cost of debt is negatively 
related to dividend payout ratios. Our results are consistent with previous literature that associates high payout ratios 
with lower information asymmetries (La Porta et al., 2000). Lower information asymmetries reduce the risk faced by 
creditors. We argue that lower risk faced by creditors translates into lower required return (Blom and Schauten, 
2008; Farooq and Derrabi, 2012). Interestingly, we also show that our results are more pronounced in firms with 
higher information asymmetries. We argue that value relevance of dividend payout ratios is greater for firms that 
have higher information asymmetries. These firms have scarcity of information. Therefore, whenever information 
disclosure improves, it is highly valued by investors.2 Our arguments are consistent with Lang et al. (2004) who 
document a positive valuation effect of mechanisms that improve information asymmetries in countries with poor 
information environment. They argue that countries with high information asymmetries have dearth of information. 
Therefore, whenever information disclosure improves, it is highly valued by investors. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the data and Section 3 presents 
assessment of our hypothesis. Section 4 documents robustness of our results and the paper ends with Section 5 
where we present our conclusions. 
 
DATA 
 
This paper documents the relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy in the MENA region. Our 
sample consists of nonfinancial firms listed at the stock exchanges of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates. Our sample covers the period between 2005 and 
2011. We will, briefly, describe the data in following sections. 
 
 Cost of Debt 
 
Cost of debt is calculated as the interest expense for the financial year divided by total debt during the same 
year.3 The data for interest expense and total debt are obtained from the Worldscope. Table 1 documents the 
descriptive statistics for the cost of debt during our sample period. The result in Panel A shows that cost of debt is 
the highest in Egypt and Tunisia, while it is the lowest in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Our results in Panel B show that 
firms belonging to Oil and Gas sector are able to raise debt at the most competitive rates. Panel C indicate relative 
                                                
1 Given that information asymmetries are associated with corporate governance mechanisms, prior literature has extensively related various 
proxies of corporate governance with the cost of debt. For instance, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) relate ownership structure with cost of debt, 
Ortiz-Molina (2006) relate managerial incentives with cost of debt, and Liu and Jiraporn (2010) CEO power with cost of debt. 
2 We would like to mention here that we are aware of the arguments that relate higher dividend payouts with higher cost of debt. These arguments 
revolve around the conflicts of interests between creditors and shareholders. These arguments state that high dividends can increase the agency 
conflicts between creditors and shareholders. Dividends reduce the cash available to meet firm’s predetermined obligations including principle 
and interest payments on debt. Given that there is adverse market reaction associated with dividend reductions, many firms would rather borrow 
to avoid cutting dividends. The additional leverage increases firm’s risk with a consequent increase in the cost of debt. To the extent that creditors 
view dividends negatively, they demand a higher rate of return from firms with large dividend payouts. This yields a positive relation between 
dividend payouts and cost of debt.  
3 The preliminary statistics indicate that the outcome provides abnormal values, and thus may introduce noise in the measurement of the effective 
cost of debt for a firm. Therefore, following Pittman and Fortin (2004), we trim the data to address extreme observations, and winsorised the 
allowed spread at the 5th and 95th percentiles of the initial pooled distribution. 
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homogeneity in the cost of debt across the years. We report, approximately, same cost of debt across our sample 
period. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for cost of debt 
Panel A: Cost of debt within each country 
Country Mean Median 
Bahrain 0.0617 0.0561 
Egypt 0.0827 0.0797 
Jordan 0.0787 0.0736 
Kuwait 0.0649 0.0579 
Morocco 0.0618 0.0534 
Oman 0.0581 0.0526 
Qatar 0.0429 0.0359 
Saudi Arabia 0.0402 0.0329 
Tunisia 0.0823 0.0684 
United Arab Emirates 0.0531 0.0474 
 
Panel B: Cost of debt within each industry 
Industry Mean Median 
Oil and Gas 0.0491 0.0457 
Basic Materials 0.0616 0.0575 
Industrials 0.0636 0.0554 
Consumer Goods 0.0716 0.0627 
Consumer Services 0.0647 0.0571 
Telecommunications 0.0709 0.0641 
Technology 0.0607 0.0565 
Utilities 0.0681 0.0551 
Healthcare 0.0703 0.0557 
 
Panel C: Cost of debt during each year 
Year Mean Median 
2005 0.0667 0.0554 
2006 0.0688 0.0604 
2007 0.0693 0.0615 
2008 0.0673 0.0587 
2009 0.0684 0.0577 
2010 0.0611 0.0534 
2011 0.0568 0.0517 
 
Dividend Policy 
 
In this study, we consider dividend payout ratio as a proxy for dividend policy. The descriptive statistics for 
dividend policy are presented in Table 2. Panel A reports relatively low level of payout ratios in the sample 
countries. None of the countries, except Morocco, have payout ratio exceeding 50%. This observation is consistent 
with the findings of previous studies that document relatively lower level of payout ratios in emerging markets. 
Panel B and Panel C support our earlier observation of low payout ratios. We report low payout ratios across all 
industries and across all years in our sample, suggesting homogeneity in dividend policies across industries and 
years. Our result in Panel C also show that increase in payout ratios in the later part of our sample. Given that payout 
ratios are proxy of governance mechanisms, our results may indicate the improvement in governance mechanisms in 
the region. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for dividend policy 
Panel A: Dividend policy within each country  
Country Mean Median 
Bahrain 48.3147 47.4800 
Egypt 44.2284 48.7800 
Jordan 45.4483 54.0250 
Kuwait 29.5610 21.3400 
Morocco 51.8411 56.4700 
Oman 41.2477 44.2000 
Qatar 39.7201 41.4100 
Saudi Arabia 33.7605 33.0600 
Tunisia 36.8356 41.0000 
United Arab Emirates 30.5116 25.8400 
 
Panel B: Dividend policy within each industry  
Industry Mean Median 
Oil and Gas 38.3303 40.6700 
Basic Materials 38.4881 41.9250 
Industrials 39.9966 43.2650 
Consumer Goods 36.6310 39.1200 
Consumer Services 38.5508 38.0500 
Telecommunications 42.5294 46.9250 
Technology 47.8950 50.7800 
Utilities 53.5380 55.0500 
Healthcare 39.9127 48.8000 
 
Panel C: Dividend policy during each year  
Year Mean Median 
2005 34.5838 32.8650 
2006 38.8504 42.5400 
2007 38.8078 39.065 
2008 37.5717 38.8900 
2009 37.7137 40.5400 
2010 41.1799 44.8300 
2011 45.0737 51.4300 
 
Control Variables 
 
This paper uses log of total assets (SIZE), total debt to total asset ratio (LEVERAGE), earnings per share 
(EPS), growth in assets (GROWTH), and interest coverage ratio (COVRATIO) as control variables. Descriptive 
statistics for control variables are provided in Table 3. An interesting observation from Table 3, Panel A, is low 
median EPS. It indicates that almost half of the firms in the MENA region were not very profitable in our sample 
period. Table 3, Panel B, shows low levels of correlations between variables. It indicates that we can include all of 
the variables together in our regression equation. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for control variables 
Panel A: Variables 
 Mean Median 
SIZE 11.9651 11.8895 
LEVERAGE 19.1314 13.8200 
EPS 4.4892 0.1300 
GROWTH 11.8737 6.75500 
COVRATIO 18.6321 4.7300 
 
Panel B: Variables 
 SIZE LEVERAGE EPS GROWTH COVRATIO 
SIZE 1.0000     
LEVERAGE 0.1180 1.0000    
EPS 0.2382 -0.0060 1.0000   
GROWTH 0.1499 0.0614 0.0032 1.0000  
COVRATIO 0.0739 -0.2608 0.1028 0.0257 1.0000 
 
Methodology 
 
The paper documents the effect of payout ratio on cost of debt in the MENA region. More In order to test 
this hypothesis, we estimate a panel regression with cost of debt (CoD) as a dependent variable and dividend payout 
ratio (PoR) as an independent variable. Furthermore, mindful of the effects that firm-specific characteristics may 
have on cost of debt, we also add number of firm-specific variables in our regression equation as control variables. 
These variables are SIZE, LEVERAGE, EPS, GROWTH, and COVRATIO. To control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we also include dummy variables representing firm-specific fixed effects (FDUM). It is important to 
mention here that we use panel data regression with fixed effects for our analysis. Hausman test was used to decide 
between fixed effect and random effects. Our basic regression takes the following form. 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) εFDUMβCOVRATIOβGROWTHβ
EPSβLEVERAGEβSIZEβ
PoRβαCoD
Fxd
Fxd
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432
1
++++
+++
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The results of our analysis are reported in Table 4. Our result shows that increase in dividend payout ratio 
causes cost of debt to go down by 0.0080 units. We report significant and negative coefficient of PoR. We argue that 
increase in dividend payout ratios are used by firms as a signal to tell investors that firms are governed properly. 
Good governance should result in lowering information asymmetries, thereby reducing the cost of debt. 
Furthermore, high payout ratios may also indicate lower level of agency problems within the firm by signaling to the 
market that no excess cash is available to expropriate (Easterbrook, 1984). This will also result in lowering the cost 
of debt. 
 
Table 4. Relationship between dividend policy and cost of debt 
Variables Equation (1) 
PoR -0.0080** 
GROWTH -0.0204*** 
SIZE 0.4399 
LEVERAGE -0.1334**** 
EPS -0.0170* 
COVRATIO -0.0305*** 
Fixed Effects Yes 
No. of observations 1437 
No. of groups 407 
F-value 12.12 
R2 within 0.2166 
Note: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% a significance 
level by***. 
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ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS 
 
Effect of Legal Traditions on the Relationship Between Dividend Policy and Cost of Debt 
 
In this section, we divide our sample into two groups – one group with firms headquartered in the civil law 
countries and the other group with firms headquartered in the common law countries. We re-estimate Equation (1) 
for both groups. Our results are reported in Table 5. Our results show that our earlier findings hold only in the civil 
law countries. We report significantly negative coefficient of PoR in the civil law countries and insignificant 
coefficient of PoR in the common law countries. These findings are interesting as well as intuitive. Given that firms 
in the civil law countries experience higher information asymmetries, conventional wisdom would suggest that value 
relevance of dividend policy should be higher in the civil law countries. Our arguments are consistent with Lang et 
al. (2004) who document a positive valuation effect of mechanisms that improve information asymmetries in 
countries with poor information environment. They argue that countries with high information asymmetries have 
scarcity of information. Therefore, whenever information disclosure improves, it is highly valued by investors. 
 
Table 5. Effect of legal traditions on the relationship between dividend policy and cost of debt 
Variables  Common Law Civil Law 
PoR -0.0034 -0.0092** 
GROWTH -0.0293*** -0.0197*** 
SIZE 0.8484 0.4252 
LEVERAGE -0.1170*** -0.1379*** 
EPS -0.0644 -0.0163* 
COVRATIO -0.0183*** -0.0356*** 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
No. of observations 346 1091 
No. of groups 99 308 
F-value 5.71 9.29 
R2 within 0.2482 0.2206 
Note: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% a significance 
level by***. 
 
Effect of Growth Opportunities on the Relationship Between Dividend Policy and Cost of Debt 
 
In this section, we divide our sample into two groups – one group with above median growth of entire 
sample and the other group with below median growth of entire sample. Main motivation behind dividing our 
sample into low growth and high growth firms is our assumption that high growth firms have higher information 
symmetries. Existing studies argue that the asymmetric information problem is more severe for firms with 
significant growth opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992). We re-estimate Equation (1) for both groups. We present 
our results in Table 6. Our results show that our earlier findings hold only in high growth firms. We report 
significantly negative coefficient of PoR for high growth firms and insignificant coefficient of PoR for low growth 
firms. As was mentioned earlier, we argue that high information asymmetries embedded in high growth firms make 
payout ratios more value relevant in these firms relative to low growth firms.   
 
Table 6. Effect of growth on the relationship between dividend policy and cost of debt 
Variables  High Growth Low Growth 
PoR -0.0091* -0.0084 
GROWTH -0.0191*** -0.0216 
SIZE 0.1444 1.0505 
LEVERAGE -0.1283*** -0.1290*** 
EPS -0.0094 -0.0278 
COVRATIO -0.0273*** -0.0325*** 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
No. of observations 805 632 
No. of groups 337 315 
F-value 6.07 5.41 
R2 within 0.1982 0.2645 
Note: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% a significance 
level by***. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper explores the relationship between dividend payout ratios and cost of debt in the MENA region 
during the period between 2005 and 2011.  Our results show a significantly negative relationship between cost of 
debt and dividend payout ratios. We argue that high payout ratios alleviate agency conflicts and lower information 
asymmetries.  Lower information asymmetries reduce the risk faced by creditors.  As a result, they require lower 
return for providing capital to firms with high dividend payout ratios.  We also show that our results are more 
pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetries.  This indicates that value relevance of dividend payout 
ratios is higher in firms that have higher information asymmetries. These firms have scarcity of information.  
Therefore, whenever information environment improves, it is highly valued by creditors. 
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